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SECRET INFORMATION

SMOFET AUTH CS. USAF

10 Farch 1953

D/I, USAF SURGESTED ADDITION TO SE-39: PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALERKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USER

The D/I, USAF suggests the following footnote to the first sentence of Paragraph 1, Page 1, for consideration of the IAC sembers:

Although this is our considered judgment, a second view merits consideration, i.e., that the Soviets may have developed a unique skill for transferring power in a totalitarian state. The speed and precision with which at least nominal power has been transferred to Malenkov suggests this possibility and also the possibility that no power struggle will develop among Soviet leaders as a result of Stalin's death.

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

CIA has no objection to declass it contains information of CIA interest that must remain

USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File

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Page 4, Para 8:

Therefore However, the cohesion of the Communist movement outside the Bloc way is not likely to be impaired, at least temporarily. If, on the other hand there-should be a struggle for power should develop within the Soviet Communist Party, the cohesion of the Communist movement outside the outside the Bloc way is not likely to be impaired, at least temporarily. If, on the other hand there-should be a struggle for power should develop within the Soviet Communist Party, the cohesion of the Communist movement outside the Bloc would almost certainly be weakened.

Page 6, Para 13:

"13. We believe that in general the Western Europe leaders will be disposed for the time being to conduct the East West struggle with greater hesitancy and caution." They will probably fear that any immedate new Western pressure or the Bloc would increase the danger of war and facilitate the stabilization of authority in the USSR. They will also probably hope that, if new Western pressure is not exerted, the problems involved in the consolidation of the authority of the new regime of the USSR will bring about at least a temporary relaxation of tensions and enable them to postpone disagreeable policy decisions."

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